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CHAPTER 9
God’s Uses of the Law and the Effort to Establish a 
Constitutional Right to the Means to Live 
Marie A. Failinger and Patrick R. Keifert
Therefore, it would be very proper to place in a coat-of-arms of every 
pious prince a loaf of bread instead of a lion, or a wreath of rue, or to 
stamp it upon the coin, to remind both them and their subjects that by 
their office we have protection and peace, and without them we could 
not eat and retain our daily bread.
The Book of Concord1
To the state of Maryland, Jeanette and Junius Gary were merely welfare 
recipients who had too many children.2 After a number of miscarriages that 
led her to despair of her barrenness, Jeanette bore Junius eight children in 
less than seven years. Unfortunately, her health was compromised by these 
pregnancies, resulting in high blood pressure, arthritis, and maybe diabetes. 
Junius, a hard-working man with an engineering bent, who was honorably 
discharged from the Army after severe injuries, was employed during these 
years as a truck driver and chauffeur until he was in an automobile accident. 
He became unable to work because of dizzy spells, blackouts, and seizures, 
and then unexpectedly died at the age of forty-five.
Faith and family were the center of the Garys’ lives. But they had to seek 
assistance from the state of Maryland to survive due to their disabilities. To
1. Lutheran Confessions, The Lord’s Prayer, Fourth Petition, Book of Concord: 'lhe 
Symbols of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans, and ed. Theodore G. Tappert (St. Louis: 
Concordia, 1957), p. 202.
2. The facts recounted about the Gary family are taken from Julie Nice, “A Sweeping 
Refusal of Equal Protection: Dandridge v. Williams (1970)” in the forthcoming book The 
Poverty Law Canon, ed. Ezra Rosser and Marie A. Failinger (2016).
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discourage welfare recipients from having more children, the state capped 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children assistance to families at $250 per 
month, well below the poverty line and even below the rock-bottom basic 
needs even the state recognized that large families had. That cap was the 
most any family on welfare could receive, regardless of the actual number of 
persons in a family, and the Garys struggled just to eat every day.
Today, many national constitutions recognize a constitutional right to 
the means to live. This right is even written into international law: Article 
11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his fam­
ily, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.”3 
Yet, the United States has refused to ratify this Covenant, or to acknowledge 
any affirmative right of human beings to government assistance in meeting 
basic survival needs.4 That refusal to recognize a basic right to the means to 
five does not distinguish between a healthy adult who has available work 
and others, such as children or elderly or disabled persons, their caretak­
ers, or those who want to work but are unemployable or underemployed in 
changing markets.
To be sure, both federal and state governments have created numerous 
programs to assist low-income citizens and residents of the United States: 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) for families; Supplemen­
tal Security Income (SSI) for aged, blind, and disabled individuals; and the 
SNAP program (formerly Food Stamps) are among these. Some have ar­
gued that these programs are more generous than those in some countries
3. Article 11, Sec. 1, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 16,1966, art. 12,993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 (entered into force Jan. 3,1976), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx (accessed 
March 14, 2014). This covenant also recognizes the right of people to self-determination, 
the right of the family to protection, and the rights to work, to health, education, and to 
cultural participation.
4. The United States signed the covenant in 1977, but Congress has refused to ratify 
or make accession to it since then. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Chapter 4 part 
3, Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, https://treaties.un.org/pages/view 
details.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty (accessed March 14, 2014). 
As of March 2014, there were 161 parties to this treaty.
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that have signed on to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, but they are not as generous as those in many industrialized 
nations, even those with less national wealth than the U.S.
Despite the existence of these programs, many of which date back to the 
Depression of the 1930s, American courts and legislatures have turned back 
attempts to declare that these or any programs are enforceable human rights. 
Perhaps most dramatically, in the Garys’ lawsuit to overturn the $250 family 
cap on welfare benefits, which became the Supreme Court case of Dandridge 
v. Williams, Justice Potter Stewart famously responded, “the intractable eco­
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare 
assistance programs are not the business of this Court.”5 Accordingly, since 
the 1970s, the Supreme Court has consistently proclaimed that there is no 
constitutional right to the basics for survival. While the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to recognize a right to the means to live can be explained in part by 
constitutional concerns such as separation of powers, federalism, and the 
limits of judicial competence to construct social programs, the fact is that 
none of the three federal branches of government has recognized such a 
right, nor have state governments.
While a key constitutional value in the United States is the “separation of 
church and state” embodied in the Establishment Clause of the First Amend­
ment, one may wonder why the United States has refused to recognize a 
right to the means to live, despite the fact that most of its citizens continue 
to identify themselves as Christians, Jews, and Muslims, religions that all 
emphasize our duties to protect the most vulnerable in society. We suggest 
that, at least in part, this failure may be traced to theological confusion over 
the ways in which God uses the law, including secular law promulgated by 
individuals and human institutions for the sake of human community. This 
chapter assumes a consistent and thoroughgoing theocentric realism.6 As 
we consider God’s uses of the law, we will especially focus on God’s uses of 
human law, as sin, death, and the Evil One profoundly and systemically dis­
tort it. Despite these distortions, God’s primal agency in human law remains, 
often hidden, yet very real.7
Though early Western medieval literature often focused on providing for
5. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), p. 487.
6. Michael Welker, God the Spirit, trans. John F. Hoffmeyer (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1994), pp. 46-49 (providing a more sustained description of “realistic theology”).
7. For a good discussion of this theme in recent Lutheran theology, see Stephen D. 
Paulson, Lutheran Lheology (New York: T. & T. Clark International, 2011), pp. 24, 42, 54- 
55, 67, 86,151, 211.
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the poor as a form of “works-righteousness,” a way of meriting grace, early 
welfare law literature concerned itself primarily with the “receiving” side of 
welfare efforts, concentrating on the moral worthiness of recipients, describ­
ing wealth transfers as undeserved “charity” or “gift” rather than a deserved 
“right.”8 Individuals and families who demonstrated piety and conformed to 
social standards such as hard work and proper parenting were most likely to 
be fed and housed at public expense.9 In some jurisdictions, the poor were 
consigned to “poorhouses,” their children sometimes removed from their 
care to be apprenticed or brought up by persons who would teach them the 
proper moral behavior their parents had not.10
After the advent of the Reformation, however, social reformers had 
other theological paradigms to draw from, including the Lutheran views 
about the uses of the law. Most Lutheran scholars agree that this tradition 
has taught two uses of the law, the so-called civil use of the law, and the spir­
itual or theological use of the law.11 The second, theological use is sometimes 
described as a mirror that accuses sinners, holding up their sins to them 
incessantly and comprehensively so they can come to see that their only 
salvation is through the grace of God, and not their own merit or works.12
8. Larry Cata Backer, “Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century America: Looking 
Back toward a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief,” Case Western Reserve Law 
Review 44, no. 3-4 (1995): 871-1061, at 871 (noting that “the benefits of status and property, 
however, carried with them a spiritual and quasi-legal duty of charity. In time of necessity 
all people were expected to share their superfluous wealth with those in need; otherwise the 
wealthy were under no obligation to donate their wealth for charitable purposes”).
9. Backer, “Medieval Poor Law,” p. 1029 (noting that “in the medieval period... [w]hile 
the poor were thought inferior, only the able-bodied who refused to work, and thereby vio­
lated the class and status norms of medieval society, were despised as deviants and punished 
as beggars, thieves, and vagabonds”).
10. Joel F. Handler, “The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: 
The Family Support Act in Historical Context,” New York University Review of Law & Social 
Changei6 (1987-88): 457-534, at468 (noting, “The goal ofnineteenth-century welfare policy, 
therefore, was to distinguish the worthy poor from the pauper and to prevent the poor from 
passing over that line”).
11. Although these uses are described somewhat differently in theological writings and 
confessions, we will follow the distinction between the first or civil use of the law in this 
earthly kingdom, and the second or spiritual use. We do not mean to avoid the continuing 
debate on a third use but rather to propose a theological warrant for the right to the means 
to live that is more irenic and can even be shared across theological traditions.
12. Edward Engelbrecht, Friends of Ihe Law: Luther’s Use of the Law for Christian Life 
(St. Louis: Concordia, 2011), p. 9. For a longer discussion of the second use, see William H. 
Lazareth, Christians in Society: Luther, the Bible and Social Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress
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Regrettably, the first, civil use of the law is often described as only preven­
tative and punitive, established by God to deter “the wicked” from harming 
the earthly creation and to provide appropriate earthly retribution for them 
if they do. There is also a significant literature debating whether Martin Lu­
ther, or the Lutheran tradition that follows Luther, recognized a third use 
of the law.* 13 Those modern Lutheran theologians who have advocated for a 
more robust third use of the law have often reverted to the traditional argu­
ment that “Gospel without Law” leads to antinomianism, i.e., the likelihood 
that Christians, who continue as sinners, will understand Christian free­
dom from the law as a license to ignore the commands of the law, deluding 
themselves that their freedom purchased by Christ permits everything, even 
those actions condemned by the Decalogue and biblical teaching. On the 
other side, Lutheran theologians who have resisted recognition of a third 
use of the law have been concerned about “Law without Gospel,” i.e., about 
the use of the law to justify oneself through one’s own holiness, the very 
works-righteous theology at the heart of Luther’s criticism. Some modern 
Lutheran theologians have also argued that a third use of the law distorts 
the actual existence and experience of a Christian, by recasting the constant 
direct (which some critics describe as existential) encounter between God 
and the Christian into a primary relationship between the Christian and the 
law, separate from God.14 The main concern of this chapter is not to settle 
the debate about whether Luther, or the authentic Lutheran tradition, has 
recognized a third use of the law. Rather, we suggest that employing the 
traditional first use Lutheran imagination of how God continues to use law 
to engage human beings in the world throughout history is a more solid 
basis on which Lutherans and other Christians can engage and challenge 
modern governments and lawmakers on issues such as the constitutional 
right to welfare. By contrast to more modernist, nontheological frames, this 
consistently theocentric frame allows for a justification for these rights that 
can be shared with Jews and Muslims.
Many Christians today employ an imagination about the uses of the law 
that bears a faint resemblance to that espoused by some of the Deist found­
ers of the American constitutional system. In the common portrayal of the
Press, 2001), pp. 116-20 (noting the exposure of human sinfulness, and human discharge 
from the law once “the regenerate appropriate God’s grace through faith”).
13. See, for example, the third use description in Engelbrecht, Friends of the Law, pp. 
79-8i.
14. The work of Robert Bertram, Gerhard Forde, and Edward Schroeder, teachers and 
friends, has been instructive to our argument.
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constitutional founders’ imagination, God has given the natural law, with its 
foundation in the Ten Commandments, to human beings.13 Then, while God 
may be continuing to create in the “natural world,” God has stepped back 
from the human community, expecting that humans will found legal institu­
tions and execute laws that carry out the basic contours of those command­
ments. This legal imagination emphasizes restraining sinners from violating 
the natural law and punishing those individuals who have transgressed it, 
thus restoring equilibrium in the secular world through retribution, among 
other reasons to equalize the situation of wrongdoer and victim, as death 
penalty proponents argue is necessary by taking a life for a life.15 6 In this 
imagination, the law of God, in its first use, provides a minimalist order to 
the secular world, but does not instruct or govern most human affairs. At 
the same time, in this view, those who are redeemed are instructed and em­
powered, through the separate sanctifying action of the Holy Spirit, to live 
holy lives in this world, and to fill the social emptiness left by the minimalist 
first use of the law with more robust, charitable, and life-giving action on 
behalf of the neighbor. (We might note how this understanding of the Holy 
Spirit’s action separates the persons and the work of the Trinity to reinforce 
the great modern divide between public and private.17)
This dual understanding of law, roughly corresponding to what has been 
called the first use and the third use of the law, has its parallel in the Amer­
ican imagination on the role of law in meeting the needs of the neighbor, 
certainly at least until the Great Depression and New Deal. In that imagi­
nation, governments chiefly operate to provide some minimal order to our 
“public” interactions in daily life by dictating rules of restraint for govern­
ments, institutions, and individuals — rules against violence, theft, slander, 
etcetera punishable by fines, imprisonment, or civil judgments. These rules, 
while founded on key natural law expectations, are largely developed by 
self-regulating human beings as they encounter changing conditions and
15. Recent research has debunked the claim that “the God of the Enlightenment deists 
was a remote, uninvolved, watchmaker God that generated no love or warmth in people.” 
Joseph Waligore, Introduction to Deism, http://www.enlightenmentdeism.com/?page_id= 
25 (accessed December 12, 2014).
16. See Linda E. Carter, Ellen S. Kreitzberg, and Scott W. Howe, Understanding Capital 
Punishment, 2nd ed. (Newark: Matthew Bender, 2008), pp. 11-13.
17. Many secular philosophers have raised these same questions regarding what has 
been called “the modern dogma,” which accepts the fact-value split. See Wayne C. Booth, 
Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 
pp. 13-24.
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new ways in which sinful persons engage in wrongdoing. Thus, criminal 
laws against theft of property from the person can be reimagined through 
human ingenuity to produce embezzlement laws and even prohibitions 
against insider trading and theft of intellectual property. Meanwhile, other 
“private” social needs are filled by the generosity of the charitable act, the 
voluntary largesse of individuals, social institutions such as the church, and 
even governments. Yet, much like the medieval conception, “givers” are 
expected to give out of their abundance, not to the extent that their own 
personal needs or desires are jeopardized. Thus, for example, modern tax 
schemes assume that individual taxpayers are legally and morally entitled 
to “keep” the income they have “earned,” unless government determines 
that social welfare will be significantly enhanced by government collection 
of taxes to fund a common project that will increase community economic 
success, including for the “givers,” e.g., the highways taxpayers use to get to 
work, or a football stadium that will bring employment. Even if Americans 
are motivated by a variety of other reasons to create social programs such as 
TANF and SNAP, including compassion for the needy, few of them would 
accede to the claim that these programs create a legal right in needy recip­
ients to the means to live.
In constitutional terms, this imagination has been captured in the distinc­
tion between “negative rights” against government interference with personal 
freedom and “affirmative rights” to government assistance in order to flourish 
on one’s freedom. The Constitution has been read by American courts and 
legislatures as a “negative rights” document, with some few exceptions. Dan­
dridge v. Williams is a prime example of this “negative rights” understanding; 
the Supreme Court holds that the Gary family has no legal claim on govern­
ment to perform a duty to provide for their basic subsistence needs.
We would suggest that the Lutheran tradition teaches a richer and 
more nuanced understanding of God’s uses of the law that can better in­
form our human responsibilities to respond to the neighbor’s need through 
government and secular social organizations. We will explore how five in­
terrelated errors in the modern thinking about the relationship between 
God, the church, and secular law and legal institutions can be challenged 
by the Lutheran tradition. First, in the Lutheran understanding, God is no 
watchmaker who starts the world turning and then lets us fend for ourselves. 
Rather, God is the primal agent in our efforts; God continues to create in and 
with the human community, including in our creation of secular law.18 That
18. Lazareth, Christians in Society, p. 66.
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is to say, when human beings write and enforce law, God is there, moving 
by the power of the Holy Spirit through our work, whether we understand 
and acknowledge and heed or rebel against God’s presence.
Second, God’s uses of the secular law — God’s demands on human per­
sons and institutions — are not simply retributive, setting forth minimalist 
expectations to be met with punishment when we refuse to heed those de­
mands. Rather, God works in the world of this age with us to create new 
human institutions, to preserve and enrich human community through our 
service to the neighbor, and to repair the world’s brokenness. That work of 
repair is not only for the world’s spiritual brokenness (God’s second use of 
the law) but also its material and social brokenness, from environmental de­
struction and family violence to eradication of social discrimination against 
vulnerable groups.
Third, God moves through the law, teaching, encouraging, demanding, 
and punishing not just Christians but all persons. God is instructing and 
inspiring not only redeemed Christians to work toward “God’s preferred 
and promised future” for us all; indeed, the law calls every human being to 
this task.19 Similarly, both Christians and non-Christians fall short of God’s 
expectations for a world that is trustworthy for all; and both Christians and 
non-Christians are exhorted to make the needs of the human community 
their own through secular law. We may anticipate failure in this task due to 
sin, death, and the Evil One, but that does not end God’s desire, preference, 
command, indeed, demand on us to work for that future.
Fourth, an exclusive emphasis on the third use of the law in creating a 
trustworthy world risks reinstating the error of theocratic perfectionism 
that has characterized America’s civil religion. Finally, such an emphasis can 
construct a wall of separation between God’s work in using law to create a 
civil society and God’s work in forming Christian community to serve that 
society. For the Christian, in the Lutheran view, no such wall of separation 
exists.
We elaborate on these points starting with the first key error that both 
lawyers and political activists, including Lutherans, make as they attempt to
19. On God’s preferred and promised future, see generally Patrick R. Keifert, We Are 
Here Now (St. Paul, MN: Church Innovations Publishing, 2006). This expression is a de­
velopment of the law/promise distinction building on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s reworking of 
that classic formulation through the language of penultimate and ultimate. This formulation 
follows Philip Melanchthon’s in Apology of the Augsburg Confession, IV, 'Ihe Book of Con­
cord, pp. 32-42. One summary of Article IV for our purposes might be, “How to promote 
good works without losing the free promise.”
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shape the legal rules for the secular world on difficult issues such as abortion 
and same-sex marriage out of natural law understandings. That is, it is easy 
to proceed as if the natural law is sui generis, a static set of legal or value 
principles that exists “out there” rather than the ongoing will and work of 
God in human history. Or, to play with the title of this chapter, God’s uses 
of the law may become “the” or “our” uses of the law, whether they are two 
or three or many. Even those who, if challenged, would concede that law 
is God’s work in the world tend to reason as if this were not so. They — we 
— then commit a common idolatrous sin: we begin to interpret the natural 
law from a “thoroughly anthropomorphic” perspective, creating our own 
image of God and God’s will for the world instead of recognizing our status 
as recipients of God’s law, as first and foremost the creatures rather than 
creators of law.20
From this perspective, it is easy to begin to unhook philosophy of law 
from the ever-present intervention and command of God that emanates from 
and is responsive to the ever-changing nature of the creation.21 Even humanity 
itself is constantly undergoing change, both biological and social. Yet, once 
jurisprudence and law-making are relationally unhooked from the continu­
ously creating Trinity, and lawyers and political activists think that they can 
depend only on human rationality to structure secular law, their work be­
comes a perversion of God’s will for the world. That amnesia about God’s 
ongoing participation in our fate results in rigidified and theologically prob­
lematical assumptions about human nature that structure our views, whether 
conservative or liberal, on providing for our fellow human beings in need, 
e.g., human beings are naturally corrupt and lazy, and will never exert effort 
to care for themselves and their families without coercion, so families should 
be refused help with the means to live in order to force parents to provide for 
their families. Or, we might incorrectly assume, poor people like the Garys 
are incapable of managing their own lives, so a humane government or society 
must step in to provide for their basic needs, help them address their pathol­
ogies, and conform their lives in ways that let them participate effectively in 
mainstream societies. While each of these arguments is seemingly grounded
20. Johannes Heckel, Lex Charitatis: A Juristic Disquisition on Law in the 'Iheology of 
Martin Luther, trans. Gottfried G. Krodel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), p. 27.
21. For example, in his lectures on Genesis, Luther pointed out, “God did not therefore 
in the seventh day cease to work in every sense, but he works still, not only in preserving 
his whole creation, but also in altering and new-forming the creature.” John N. Lenker, 
Luther on the Creation: A Critical and Devotional Commentary on Genesis 1-3 (Minneapolis: 
Lutherans in All Lands Co., 1904), p. 67.
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in human reason and experience, they not only oversimplify the human story 
of vulnerable families like the Garys but do not even pretend to consider how 
God is working in the world to provide for the Garys’ material and spiritual 
needs through their callings to each other and others’ callings to them.
Because Lutherans recognize that human beings are co-creators of this 
secular world, including secular law, we are not excused from making law even 
though law-malting necessarily relies, in part, on our own flawed and sinful ex­
perience and reasoning. Most certainly, our human understanding of secular 
natural law will be corrupted because, as Johannes Heckel claims that Luther 
argued, human understanding of the experience of true love for God and the 
neighbor becomes “weak, dim and crude” as a result of sin.22 Luther, Heckel 
notes, emphasizes that human beings will constantly misuse the very search 
for the principles of secular natural law as a true search for God’s will, and 
become arrogantly confident of their ability to “re-think God’s thoughts.”23 
Secular human laws will inevitably reflect the sin of human beings advocating 
for laws that favor themselves or their own righteousness before God, under 
the guise of their “discovery” of “the will” of God for creation.24
Therefore, Lutheran theology would counsel, pronouncements about 
secular natural law, and attempts to govern human communities through 
the positive laws that embody those understandings, must always be viewed 
with skepticism. They must be met with continual efforts to probe the self­
justification that may be at the heart of those descriptions, and with atten­
tion to how secular positive laws that claim to reflect natural law actually 
operate in the real, empirical world. Visible evidence that legislation and 
enforcement of particular positive laws are causing damage to the environ­
ment or to intimate human relationships such as marriage is evidence that 
human beings may well “have it wrong” in their understanding of secular 
natural law, whether from human sin or simply human limitation. Thus, the 
“discovery” and pronouncement of what secular natural law requires must 
always be attended by humility, self-criticism, and the willingness to probe 
all claims about natural law.
People of faith, in particular, need to be asking the question, “What is 
God up to here? What is God’s preferred and promised future for our com­
munity?” And people of faith, along with those who are not, are called to
22. Heckel, Lex Charitatis, p. 55, citing Luther’s First Disputation against the Antino- 
mians 1537; 'Ihe Formula of Concord II, Book of Concord, pp. 218-19.
23. Heckel, Lex Charitatis, p. 56.
24. Heckel, Lex Charitatis, p. 56.
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be continually attentive to the dynamic relationship between human beings 
and the wider ongoing creation of God, and to embrace the opportunity to 
make and remake the secular law in ways that, as best as possible, seem to 
contribute to the flourishing that God demands for all persons in the world.25 
This calling requires not only our best thinking from reason and experience, 
but also constant immersion in, and listening to, the lives and experiences 
of others, listening for God’s Word for the world, and being certain that we 
will never be certain of it. Neither tradition nor idealism, which put human 
beings at the center of the law-making process, can serve as an ultimate 
good or principle if the recognition of God’s ongoing work in the world is 
to be honored.
A second key error that Lutheran interpreters can make is to conflate 
Luther’s teaching about the uses of God’s law with the kingdoms in which 
God operates. In one reading, the first or “negative” use of the law is con­
flated with the secular, or left-hand kingdom, so that deterring or punishing 
evildoers becomes the secular world’s only legitimate use of the law. The af­
firmative or positive uses of the law in structuring human community to en­
able it to flourish are forgotten in this discourse about the secular kingdom; 
they come in only as a third use of the law, a call to Christians to be holy.
Heckel, a lawyer interpreting Luther’s understanding of law, described 
the contrast that Luther saw between divine natural law and secular natural 
law, two distinct though complementary ways in which God employs law in 
the two kingdoms, “God’s kingdom under Christ” and “the kingdom of the 
world under the governing [secular] authority.”26
Heckel argues that in the Lutheran tradition, divine natural law is not a 
set of commands about right conduct, but exclusively spiritual — the Word 
and the Spirit — and directed only to believing hearts. For Luther, God’s 
commandments are radically spiritual; “God does not command anything 
external.”27 Divine law’s only objective is to create “a God-formed will,” to 
form a heart “seized by God’s spirit.” The very definition of divine natural 
law is uncoerced, joyful love that both binds the whole person in complete
25. Luther, speaking on secular authority, argued “[i]f it is God’s work and creation, 
then it is good, so good that everyone can use it in a Christian and salutary way,” and urged 
Christians to “serve God in government if the needs of his neighbor demands. For those who 
punish evil and protect the good are God’s servants and workmen.” “Temporal Authority: 
To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed” (1523), in Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, 
2nd ed., ed. Timothy Lull (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), pp. 441-42.
26. Heckel, Lex Charitatis, p. 41.
27. Heckel, Lex Charitatis, p. 45.
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surrender to God and also assures him or her of God’s love. Divine natural 
law is universal because it emanates from the Creator of law; it addresses all 
of humankind “in the status of the incorrupt nature”; it grasps the human 
being in his or her totality; it lasts eternally; and it is exhaustive of, and the 
model for, all law valid before God.28 Law is legislated as the divine will in the 
form of the Word of God that penetrates the human will as it is “resting” or 
“being drowned” in the will of God.29 While the divine law demands a work 
from the Christian, paradoxically, that work is love for the Creator that only 
God can make possible, not the person.30 The instantiation of divine natural 
law, the divine positive law, which God instituted after creation to order the 
communal life of persons in relationship to God through the institutions of 
marriage and the church, is not divine unless used spiritually, i.e., to trans­
form the will into one characterized by perfect love for God and others. 
Notably, Heckel argues, Luther rejected the idea that the Golden Rule was 
an expression of the divine natural law, “first, by its content: it demands an 
external ‘work’ (‘do also to them’); and second, by reference to the I as the 
standard of conduct (‘you want people to do to you’)”31 Divine natural law 
is not appropriate for the governance of the secular world, because love — 
God — provides law with its ontological basis, and “is binding only if the 
will of the recipient of this law affirms it as being binding,” that is, only in 
the spiritual kingdom.32
Secular natural law represents the divine intervention into the affairs of 
human beings living their daily lives on earth, the commandment that they 
reject the self-involvement and self-interest that drives the world into chaos 
to live a life for the sake of others.33 Secular positive law, intended to carry out 
the moral power of secular natural law, is that law which human beings institu­
tionalize in government and political power (which, in Luther’s view, includes 
the commands of the Decalogue that are borrowed into positive law).34
Stated another way, remembering God’s agency, we might describe sec­
ular human laws as a reflection of God’s mediation between the dynamics 
of creation and the tendencies of human agency to destroy it. Theologian 
Edward Schroeder reminds us that the law as Luther understood it was not
28. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, p. 48.
29. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, p. 49.
30. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, p. 50.
31. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, pp. 50-51.
32. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, p. 47.
33. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, pp. 56-57.
34. Heckel, Lex Cliaritatis, at pp. 57-58.
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a set of rules about lawful behavior but “nomos” or Gesetz Gottes in German, 
God’s “way of operating in the world,” reflecting human solidarity, the mem­
bership of each in the human community, and the mutual responsibility of 
all to serve each other for the common good.35 God’s law is a demand for 
life-giving behavior from human beings. It is a description of God’s preferred 
future for us, a description of behavior that can create a world that human 
beings can trust, and in that trust, can flourish and help other living beings, 
human and nonhuman, to flourish. It is a demand for more than negative 
rights, or a minimalist state. And it warrants itself both in the present de­
mands of the law and the unconditional free promise of life in Jesus Christ.
Said another way, civil law, in this case welfare law, is an example of how 
human beings can cooperate with the ongoing creation to stem the chaos 
of sin that threatens the very right to life, by responding to human need and 
securing lives. Or, it can be an example of how human beings and institutions 
can use the law to create chaos, destroy human relationships, and deny some 
or all of us the overwhelming bounty of creation.
To give just an example of how. the law can work to order or disor­
der creation, the Decalogue’s commandment against stealing (a negative 
right, or a prohibition) recognizes the fact that sinners are tempted to steal, 
whether through a simple burglary or complex financial transactions. Each 
theft creates uncertainty about what human beings can expect. Working 
with and obeying God, we can craft legal constraints for sinful thefts that 
make it possible for human beings to entrust their property to each other 
for purposes ranging from community uses to investment.
But the law of property (an affirmative right) also gives sinful human 
beings the power to destroy a trustworthy world for others, when property 
owners “stand on their rights” as an excuse to ignore the neighbor’s need for 
use of that property. Thus, in the United States, homeless people are con­
stantly being arrested for camping on doorsteps or breaking into buildings 
that are empty, just to find a warm place to sleep. God’s law for the secular 
world demands more than protection against interference with property 
rights; it demands that government cooperate with other human agents and 
the divine Agent in the project of creating legal rights that can guarantee a 
trustworthy world for these homeless people.
35- Email from Edward Schroeder to Marie Failinger, August 13,2013. See also Heckel, 
Lex Charitatis, pp. 56-57 (noting Luther’s view that the moral basis for the law “is the aware­
ness of mankind’s solidarity and mutual responsibility as a body whose members are called 
to serve one another, according to their respective talents; its goal is the common welfare”).
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The third and related error that can arise from conflating secular natural 
law and what Heckel calls divine natural law is that Christians may incor­
rectly believe that God’s demands to order the saeculum (secular world) are 
addressed only to them. Introducing back a third use of the law directed at 
Christians not only risks a misunderstanding of how salvation operates in the 
life of a Christian. It also may imply that the heavy demands of the secular 
natural law — what we should be doing to others, as we would have them 
do to us — apply only to Christians in their status as saved persons. But if the 
purpose of the secular natural law is to order the secular world so that human 
beings and others can live in a trustworthy world in this life, then we should 
expect these heavy demands to be addressed to the activity of all persons, 
whether or not they accept the accusation of the law in its theological use, 
and whether or not they accept that their only recourse is salvation of God 
through Christ.
In this way, the narrow description of a first use as the magistrate’s use 
of the law to punish wrongdoers in this earthly life is much too cramped, 
and the third use as the instruction of the Holy Spirit only to Christians to 
do good works potentially misleading. God’s first use secular natural law as 
embodied in secular positive law functions to instruct, to exhort, to compel, 
to guide, to judge, and to punish those in this earthly life. It tells us what our 
duties are — e.g., to meet the daily needs of our neighbor. It encourages us 
that in doing so, we will be carrying out the will of God. It even expects and 
demands that we will do so, and that the judgment of God for our failure to 
do so will hang over us.
Thus, the demands of God’s law on all human beings for God’s ordering of 
our earthly world cannot be reduced to a minimalist interpretation of the Ten 
Commandments literally read as “negative” commands. Rather, the demands 
of God’s law are demands upon all living persons to care for our world and to 
give our lives for it, as we find in Luther’s Small Catechism explanations to the 
Ten Commandments, which are addressed to all persons as the law written on 
their hearts, minimalist prescriptions with maximalist demands:
The Fourth Commandment
Thou shalt honor thy father and thy mother [that it may be well with thee 
and thou mayest live long upon the earth].
What does this mean? We should fear and love God that we may not de­
spise nor anger our parents and masters, but give them honor, serve, obey, 
and hold them in love and esteem.
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The Fifth Commandment
Thou shalt not kill.
What does this mean? We should fear and love God that we may not hurt 
nor harm our neighbor in his body, but help and befriend him in every 
bodily need [in every need and danger of life and body].
Tiie Sixth Commandment
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
What does this mean? We should fear and love God that we may lead a 
chaste and decent life in words and deeds, and each love and honor his 
spouse.36
To return to the Garys for a moment, a crabbed, negative first use view 
of the law suggests that the “secular” state of Maryland has no obligation 
under the secular natural law to actually meet the Garys’ true needs, even 
the most critical of those needs, because the state’s welfare programs are 
“supererogatory and voluntary,” not obligatory responses to human need.
These issues raise a fourth error that tempts Americans, including Lu­
therans, in a nation whose civil religion has strong theocratic perfectionist 
strains: it is very easy for Lutherans who rightly seek to affirm the teaching 
of God’s law within the church to conflate it with the belief that we have 
the innate ability to sanctify ourselves. In the simplest form of this error, 
the church suggests that Christians are morally superior to non-Christians. 
This error confuses the righteousness of God and of his Word with the idea 
that our own works make us righteous, a problem that also circles back to 
Luther’s argument about the second use of the law.
While surely no Lutheran would admit to this error, subtler but none­
theless equally egregious moves are often made by those emphasizing the 
third use of the law in the care of the world. For example, this error occurs 
regularly when the church presumes that its holiness, grounded in the work 
of the Holy Spirit, grants it a morally superior stance from which to teach the 
rest of the world on questions of theological anthropology. Here it is very 
important to recognize the enduring power of sin, death, and the Devil and 
Lutherans’ suspicion of their best moral judgments. We are simul Justus et 
peccator (at once righteous and sinners) to our dying day. What holds for
36. Book of Concord, p. 160.
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the individual Christian in this regard also holds for the moral teaching of 
the church.
In the context of the right to welfare, this error toward perfectionism 
leads the church to pronounce to state officials that Christians have a morally 
better answer to questions of proper public policy, or that some system of 
social welfare benefits is the morally right system to legislate. Instead, the 
church should be engaging policy-makers in public conversation about the 
moral principles at stake, and we suggest that the appropriate place to have 
this conversation is under the first use of the law. Here, we can learn from 
conversations with legal scholars like Michael Perry and Kent Greenawalt 
about what kinds of public arguments that take into account faith’s convic­
tions are appropriate.37 To our mind, these would include appeals to com­
mon sense, common law, and the heritage of natural law.
Christians should also be clear about the proper use of the scriptures 
in this conversation with other citizens. In America, arguments from scrip­
ture are a part of the civil religion and it is hard to imagine any reasonably 
nonreductive public argument that would ignore them. Yet, how they will 
function in these diverse audiences is, after all, hardly within Christian 
control. We can only faithfully argue from scripture; we cannot determine 
how the Word of God falls upon human consciences. This is, after all, the 
work of the Spirit. However, unlike some uses of scripture, which consist of 
pronouncements about the sure will of God, Lutherans have always taken 
seriously the Isaiah passage, “Come now, let us reason together.”38 In this 
understanding, scripture functions as enthymeme, as content, and as ethos 
for the Christian’s participation in public discourse. In some cases, we can 
presume a common heritage around some passages of scripture, even among 
citizens who are not Christian. In other cases, the scripture will function as 
a raw proclamation and prophetic truth-telling. In still other cases, it will 
reveal the character of the Christians making the witness.
In such conversations, the church cannot ignore the real possibility 
that Christians will be among those making policy, and this conversation 
may have a different effect upon their souls than for those who do not 
share this faith. The Holy Spirit acts upon the sinner-saint as she chooses, 
and in keeping with God’s law and promises. In democratic public policy
37. See for example Michael J. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality 
in American Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 83-127; Kent Greenawalt, 
Private Consciences and Public Reasons (New York: Oxford University Press, 199s), pp. 39-95-
38. Isaiah 1:18, ItSV.
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discourse, the coin of the realm will always be votes, as Lutherans will 
pay careful attention to in their arguments. For Lutherans, democracy 
is not a corruption of the public conversation, but an acknowledgment 
of the way in which community participation brings forth good fruit to 
the world. This is God’s law at work, compelling the citizen to ask about 
God’s preferred and promised future, and to get to the task of co-creating 
a trustworthy world.
A fifth error that can result from the first use/third use battle is that 
Christians may try to construct a wall of separation between God’s work 
in using the law to create a civil society and God’s formation of Christian 
community to serve that civil society. This separation or wall-building loses 
the focus upon our common work of forming a trustworthy community for 
the sake of the creation. When God cast Adam and Eve from the Garden of 
Eden, he did not cast them into a world where it was impossible to form 
community with others: in their fall, they gained the knowledge of good and 
evil; and although they could not truly fear, love, and trust in God above all 
things, they were capable of creating, with God, a world in which human 
need could be met. Though their toil in rock and soil would exhaust, and 
ultimately kill them, it also could sustain the basics of life for all. This fun­
damental gift of survival is the voice of God, the divine subwoofer, saying, 
“good, very good.” As the Formula of Concord reiterates, like the rest of 
creation, the human person was “originally created by God pure and holy 
and without sin.”39 Whatever the powers of sin, death, and the Devil, they 
cannot end this goodness or eradicate this Word that calls every descendant 
of Adam and Eve to co-create a trustworthy world with God.
Conclusion
A Lutheran approach to the problem of the right to welfare, simply put, 
would make an appeal to God’s command, “Feed the poor.” All persons 
can understand this aspect of the Word of God as law, as written on their 
hearts, Christians no differently than non-Christians. Luther tells us that 
non-Christians, as well as Christians (who are still sinners), are likely to ex­
ercise a stubborn will, by saying, “No, I don’t want to” and “I don’t choose to 
see what you are telling me to see” or “Who, after all, really is my neighbor?”
39. Formula of Concord I, Book of Concord, p. 216.
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Or, they will obey, but only because they reason that “something worse will 
happen to me if I don’t.”40
To argue that the world will be created as trustworthy primarily through 
the instruction of the third use of the law is to suggest that Christians forget 
everything they knew about this word of God as law once they have been 
redeemed, and they have to relearn it once again. Instead, we suggest, Chris­
tians still know the law as, in its first use, it has been written on their hearts. 
What is different is how they respond to the word of God as law — not 
stubbornly resisting but freely and happily responding, “Why not feed the 
poor? I can’t imagine why we wouldn’t. What else is God calling us to do if 
not to do this?” That is, grace operating with the power of the Holy Spirit 
in their lives should not be described as recovering a lost knowledge about 
the need of the neighbor and the law’s demand for response to it. Rather, we 
should recognize that the gospel has opened Christians’ eyes and hearts to 
the freedom they have been given in Christ’s sacrifice to do otherwise than 
what they will do as sinners, refusing or denying the will of God, or obeying 
it grudgingly and fearfully.
If Christians have been freed from the bondage of their stubborn will, 
what is left for them to do with the secular law of human welfare? It is to 
think with others, Christian and non-Christian, who have all received God’s 
good gift of reason, about how to feed the poor. Some of that reasoning will 
be in the church; Christians will exhort each other to look within the moral 
traditions of church and world to interpret that “how” for a modern world. 
Some of the church’s contribution will be in forming community with the 
poor, creating relationships of trust, love, and respect that are not available 
or even realistically expected from government bureaucracies. Some of that 
contribution will be in partnerships with civil society, which have as their 
aim faithfulness to God’s mission in the world.
Such community is grounded in the way that we are all created, compel­
ling us to be in solidarity with all others, because the alternative to solidarity 
is the death of the world. Our calling to solidarity with those like the Garys 
who are also at once saints and sinners is the church’s obligation to articu­
late and to carry out in cooperation with our fellow citizens. We might also 
describe the work of the law of God as this: the Spirit compels from the past
40. See Luther’s sermon for New Year’s Day on Galatians 3:23-29 (noting three attitudes 
toward the law — bold opposition to the law through a dissolute life, outward obedience 
based on a fear of death and hell, and external and inward obedience, “with the heart”). 
Engelbrecht, Friends of the Law, p. 80.
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an emerging new reality and from the future breaking-in of a prophetic word 
that opens a space for innovation that results in solidarity. Even if we do not 
currently recognize a right to the basic means to live, our past and our future 
come to meet at a new present, a new moment for a new possibility of a right 
to survive. The very nature of God is this kind of creative emergence, so we 
should not be surprised if this perduring interest in creating a trustworthy 
world takes on new forms and new compelling forces and reasons, including 
the emerging idea of an international right to life.
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